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THE R.A. V. CASE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
HATE SPEECH LAWS AND HATE
CRIME LAWS
ANTHONY S. WINERt

Violent attacks against members of minority groups that are
motivated by bigotry against those groups appear to have increased in recent years. Political commentators and other participants in public discourse, including some of the
contributors to this Symposium, have noted this apparent
trend. It is difficult to know whether the apparent increase is
due to a greater number of attacks or to improved reporting
and heightened awareness. However, there is a common perception that the number of such attacks is unacceptably high.
It should be emphasized that these attacks against minorities
are often violent, resulting in physical injury or substantial
property damage. Although it may seem that verbal abuse of
minorities is also increasing, it is fair to assume that violent
attacks against minorities involve injuries of a different and
more serious kind than mere verbal abuse.
The apparent increase in such violence has not gone without
attempts by lawmakers to reverse the trend. State and local
governments and educational institutions have enacted statutes, ordinances and other rules in an effort to address hatemotivated violence. Such enactments are often called "hate
crime" laws. I will explain below why I believe this description
is not always apt. One such "hate crime" law, adopted at the
municipal level, was the St. Paul city ordinance that was overturned in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.'
Civil libertarians and others voicing First Amendment concerns have on occasion objected to these "hate crime" enactments, as indeed they did in connection with the ordinance at
issue in the R.A. V case. Such objections are most often stated
in terms of the need to protect free speech or expression, and
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it was on such grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance involved in the R.A. V case. In that case,
however, the Supreme Court did not decide on the constitutionality of all "hate crime" laws.
All of the statutes, ordinances and other regulations adopted
in this area can be grouped into two broad classifications.
They can be classified either as "hate speech" laws or "hate
crime" laws. The ordinance in the R.A. V case was a "hate
speech" law and not a "hate crime" law, as I use that phrase, at
all. The Supreme Court's opinion in the R.A. V case thus resolves the First Amendment issue only for "hate speech" laws,
and does not provide a clear indication as to the constitutionality of enactments more aptly considered as "hate crime" laws.
"HATE SPEECH" LAWS

"Hate speech" laws are legal restrictions on what people can
say to one another, either verbally, in writing or through expressive conduct. As noted above, one example of a hate
speech law was the St. Paul city ordinance invalidated by the
Supreme Court in R.A.V The ordinance, in pertinent part,
read:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.2
The St. Paul ordinance was a hate speech law because it
could be violated merely by expressive conduct. The specific
examples it provided, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, often
are associated with violent acts as well as expressive conduct.
However, these were merely non-exclusive examples in the ordinance. The ordinance could also have applied to the placement on public or private property of "any symbol [or]
characterization ... which one ... has reason to know arouses

anger, alarm or resentment in others" on any of the prohibited
bases.
Indeed, the essential feature of the ordinance was that it addressed itself to the placement of a symbol, object or charac2. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
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terization on property. It did not apply solely to the placement
of such symbols on the property of others, nor did it apply
solely when the placement of such symbols was accompanied
by violence or the violation of the property rights of others.
Instead, it was directed to "any placement" of a symbol or appellation on any property; an inherently communicative act.
Thus, the St. Paul ordinance conceivably could have been
used to prohibit a homeowner from placing on her own property, for example, certain kinds of posters or political placards
arguing in favor of gay rights, or (as has been noted elsewhere)3 arguing for or against legal abortions. Such messages
might well cause "anger, alarm or resentment" in certain
"others" on the "basis" of "religion" or "gender." Yet it
should be fairly clear that free expression on such issues, certainly to the extent of placing signs on one's own property,
should be constitutionally protected.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation 4 of the St.
Paul ordinance did not alter its character as a hate speech law.
The Minnesota court construed the ordinance narrowly, in an
attempt to save the ordinance (in the court's view) from overbreadth. According to this interpretation, the ordinance was
meant to restrict only those kinds of speech that are outside
the protection of the First Amendment under the U.S.
Supreme Court's holdings in Chaplinsky5 and Brandenburg.6
Whether or not such a narrowing construction was justified, it
still left the ordinance as one that addressed itself purely to the
phenomenon of communication. The communication addressed may or may not have been protected by the First
Amendment, but still speech or expressive conduct was the
subject of the ordinance.
University speech codes are another example of legal restrictions that can frequently be categorized as hate speech laws.
Although a university does not have general law-making power
for the entire populace, its policies can have a legally binding
effect for those students, faculty and staff subject to them. Accordingly, to this extent it is justified to refer to university
3.
(1992)
4.
5.
6.

E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 20, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(No. 90-7675).
See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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speech codes as legal rules and, when appropriate, hate speech

laws.
One representative sample of such codes is the following excerpt from the University of Wisconsin policy, which prohibited, among other things:
racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals ...

if such comments, epithets

[or] other expressive behavior ...
1) demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or
age of the individual or individuals, and
2) create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university related work, or
other university-authorized activity. 7
Again, this restriction is a hate speech law because it is directed to "comments, epithets or other expressive behavior."
By its terms, it restricts speech or expressive conduct.
Although these kinds of speech or expressive conduct may
often be accompanied by violent behavior, the code by its
terms does not require violent behavior to take place in order
for a violation of the code to occur.
In sum, to determine whether a particular statute, ordinance
or other legal restriction is a hate speech law, one may pose the
question: "Can this legal restriction be violated solely by engaging in speech or expressive conduct?" If so, then the law is
a hate speech law. Of course, some such laws may be phrased
so that they can also apply when violent behavior or property
rights violations have occurred along with the offending
speech. But as long as it is possible to breach the restriction by
merely saying something, the restriction can be grouped in the
category of hate speech laws.
"HATE CRIME"

LAWS

"Hate crime" laws, as I suggest the phrase be used, are
structured completely differently from the hate speech laws described above. The focus of hate crime laws is not on restrict7. See Robert W. McGee, Comment, Hate Speech, Free Speech and the University, 24

AKRON L. REV. 363, 385 (1990). This provision of the University of Wisconsin policy
was declared in violation of the First Amendment. UMW Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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ing speech but on the appropriate level of punishment for
certain violent behavior.
A hate crime law, so construed, generally applies only to situations in which a violent crime, such as assault, battery, murder or arson, has already occurred and been proven. It would
customarily provide that if the perpetrator committed the
crime because of, for example, the race, religion, ethnicity, or
sexual orientation of the victim, then that crime is classified as
a "hate crime." As a result of the crime being so classified, the
hate crime law increases the perpetrator's sentence by, say, six
months to a year, or by a greater amount for more serious
crimes.
Sometimes laws of this type are referred to as "sentence enhancement" or as "sentence augmentation" laws, rather than
as "hate crime" laws, the phrase I have chosen. I believe these
phrases are inadequate because criminal punishment does not
always involve a prison sentence. On the other hand, a
broader phrase such as "punishment enhancement" or "punishment augmentation" is also imprecise because many criminal statutes, such as police protection statutes, that provide for
enhanced or augmented punishments in various circumstances
are not rooted in precisely the same policy concerns as hate
crime laws. Accordingly, I believe the phrase "hate crime" law
is most appropriate.
Note that these hate crime laws apply only if a criminal prohibition of violent conduct has already been demonstrably violated. In order for a prosecution under the hate crime law to
occur, the perpetrator must have committed a violent criminal
act, such as assault, battery, murder or arson. It is not possible
to violate a hate crime law, of the type described here, merely
by saying something, writing something, or engaging in purely
expressive behavior-a violent criminal act must have first occurred. This is the principal distinction between these kinds of
laws and hate speech laws.
Many states have enacted statutes that can be broadly
grouped into the category of hate crime laws as characterized
here.8 An example is the Vermont "Hate Motivated Crimes"
statute:
A person who commits, causes to be committed or attempts
8. Twenty-nine states have enacted hate crime laws, as I employ that term, as of
this writing.
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to commit any crime and whose conduct is maliciously motivated by the victim's actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, service in the
armed forces of the United States, handicap .... or sexual
orientation shall be subject to the following penalties:
(1) If the maximum penalty for the underlying crime
is one year or less, the penalty for a violation of this
section shall be imprisonment for not more than two
years or a fine of not more than $2,000, or both.
(2) If the maximum penalty for the underlying crime
is more than one year but less than five years, the penalty for a violation of this section shall be imprisonment
for not more than five years or a fine of not more than
$10,000, or both.
(3) If the maximum penalty for the underlying crime
is five years or more, the penalty for the underlying
crime shall apply; however, the court shall consider the9
motivation of the defendant as a factor in sentencing.
The distinction drawn in this essay between hate speech laws
and hate crime laws is evident in comparing this Vermont statute and the St. Paul city ordinance quoted earlier. The St. Paul
ordinance could (even as interpreted by the State supreme
court) be violated simply by expressing a controversial viewpoint through the placement of a sign or poster on one's own
property. The Vermont statute can only be violated if first an
underlying crime has been committed.
HATE CRIME LAws v. HATE SPEECH LAws

Because hate speech laws by their terms address communication, they directly implicate First Amendment concerns. Arguments can be made asserting that hate speech laws are
facially invalid under the First Amendment because they impermissibly prohibit acts of speech on the basis of content. Alternatively, hate speech laws can be attacked as overbroad,
since some such laws may be worded broadly enough to prohibit protected forms of speech as well as harmful speech acts
deserving less protection under the First Amendment.
Indeed, both these approaches were evident in the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the hate speech ordinance involved in
R.A. V Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated that the St. Paul
ordinance was "facially unconstitutional" because it imposed
9. VT.

STAT. ANN. tit.

13, § 1455 (1991).
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"special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects" and was not narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.' 0 The basis forJustice White's concurring opinion, on the other hand, did not focus on contentneutrality or compelling state interests. Rather, Justice White
disapproved the St. Paul ordinance on overbreadth grounds."
One does not need to address the merits of either of these
positions to observe that they both relate to the St. Paul ordinance as a hate speech law, which by its terms prohibits certain
forms of speech as speech. Hate crime laws are not directed
facially at speech in the same way that hate speech laws are.
Indeed, one can violate a hate crime law without saying
anything.
None of the Supreme Court opinions in R.A. V, including
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, provides an unambiguous indicator of the constitutionality of hate crime laws, as opposed to
hate speech laws, although certain statements in the majority
2
opinion could be used to distinguish the two kinds of laws.'
However, as noted earlier in this essay, it seems fairly obvious
in our Anglo-American legal tradition that the type of injury
inflicted by violent attacks on persons or property is of a different and more serious type than that inflicted by mere offensive
speech. Accordingly, the courts might well be justified in allowing less constitutional protection for the expressive element of a hate crime than for the expressive element of hate
speech. Under this view, many hate crime laws would still survive constitutional scrutiny, notwithstanding the invalidation
of hate speech laws under R.A. V.
One can argue against this view, and insist that even hate
crime statutes are invalid under the First Amendment.' 3 Such
10. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2557 (1992).
11. Id. at 2550.
12. Justice Scalia suggested in the majority opinion that a statutory prohibition of
fighting words "that are directed at certain persons or groups" would be "facially
valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 2548. He also
suggested that a statutory prohibition of only those fighting words "that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner" might be
analyzed differently than the St. Paul ordinance at issue in the R.A. V case. Id. at
2549.
13. Various state courts have begun to address this issue. Two state supreme
courts have decided, since the issuance of the Supreme Court's R.A. V. opinion, that
their state hate crime statutes are unconstitutional, although neither decision treats
the R.A. V holding as determinative of the hate crime issue. State v. Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992); State v.
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a position would not receive unambiguous support from the
holding of the majority opinion in R.A. V, and it would even be
subject to attack on the basis of some of the language in that
opinion.
The question of the constitutionality of hate crime laws,
properly so called, still awaits resolution by the United States
Supreme Court.
Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992). On the other hand, at least one state supreme
court has declared its state hate crime statute constitutional, notwithstanding the
R.A. V. holding. State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992). Lower courts in other
states are also beginning to address the question. E.g., Richards v. State, No. 902912, 1992 WL 335899 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. Nov. 17, 1992).
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